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Essay
Justice Kennedy and the Fisher Revisit:
Will the Irrelevant Prove Decisive?

Richard Lempert*
I.

Justice Kennedy's Options

Most Court watchers expect Justice Kennedy to cast the deciding vote
when the Supreme Court hands down its decision in this term's installment
of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin' or, as it is colloquially titled,
FisherII. What divides observers is not whose vote will be crucial, but the
law that vote will make. At one extreme, Justice Kennedy could vote to
uphold the Fifth Circuit's reaffirmation of its earlier decision. When the case
was heard, this would almost certainly have meant affirming the circuit
court's decision by an equally divided Court. (Justice Kagan, an almost
certain supporter of the Texas holistic admissions plan, has recused herself
because when the Fifth Circuit heard the appeal in Fisher 1 2 , she was
Solicitor General and her office, representing the United States, sided with
the University.) With Justice Scalia's death, if Kennedy voted to uphold the
Fifth Circuit's decision there would be an opinion. At the other extreme,
Justice Kennedy could vote to find race-conscious admissions plans
unconstitutional, either retreating from his view that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not necessarily prohibit all race-conscious governmental

* Eric Stein Distinguished University Professor of Law & Sociology, Emeritus, University of
Michigan, Direct Correspondence to rlempertgumich.edu.
1. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher 1), No. 14-981 (argued Dec. 9, 2015).
2. Fishery. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher1), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).

2016]

Essay

decisions or taking an approach like the Court's in Furman v. Georgia.3
Furman appeared to have outlawed capital punishment, but not all the
Justices who voted with the majority regarded the death penalty as
necessarily unconstitutional. 4 What the majority seemed to agree on was that
no state had found a constitutionally acceptable way to administer the death
penalty.5 Justice Kennedy could decide that even though attending to race
did not necessarily offend the Fourteenth Amendment, it was nonetheless
time to end affirmative action because no school had been able to design a
constitutionally compliant affirmative action plan. Such an opinion might,
however, leave open the door for a differently designed race-conscious
approach.
Neither of these extreme outcomes appear likely. The first, which never
seemed plausible, had one thing going for it. Justice Kennedy's ambivalence
might have led him to welcome a decision that, unaccompanied by an
opinion, would create no precedent. This was possible when the Court might
have divided equally, but it no longer is. The second remains a possibility
since Justice Kennedy has an almost-perfect record of finding
unconstitutional any race-conscious program that the Court has agreed to
hear, including Grutter v. Bollinger,6 which the University of Texas at Austin
(UT Austin) took as permission to supplement the Texas "Top Ten Percent
Plan" with race-conscious holistic admissions.7 Yet even while disapproving
of race-conscious program after race-conscious program, Justice Kennedy
has consistently said that that the Fourteenth Amendment leaves room for the
right kind of attention to race, although only recently has he suggested what
the right kind of attention might be. 8
Still, it would be a surprise if Kennedy joined the Court's three
consistent opponents of affirmative action and held that racial preferences
were in no circumstances constitutional. Fisher II is the wrong vehicle for
such a judgment. Neither the plaintiff's brief nor her counsel's arguments to
the Court challenged the constitutionality of affirmative action regardless of
circumstances. Rather the plaintiffs case focuses on whether the degree of
integration achieved by the Texas Ten Percent Plan and the possibility of
tweaks to that plan means that race-conscious supplementation is not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster. Although the

3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. Id. at 323.
5. See id. at 304-05 (noting an inconsistency between the public belief that murderers should
die and the random few who are actually executed).
6. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
7. Fisher1, 133 S. Ct. at 2413.
8. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525
(2015). I discuss the implications of this case below.
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Texas Ten Percent Plan was a race-conscious legislative response to the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Hopwood 9 and works to increase minority
representation only because many Texas secondary schools are de facto
racially segregated, the fact that it does not mention race and applies equally
to students of all races is sure to appeal to Kennedy. UT Austin will have a
hard time convincing him not only that more needs to be done, but also that
the only way to do more is to attend specifically to race.
The most likely outcome in FisherII is that Justices Thomas, Alito and
Roberts will find that including race as an element in holistic admissions is
unconstitutional since these Justices seem ready to hold that all raceconscious affirmative action programs are unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy
is likely to be torn between two outcomes. One is to find for Abigail Fisher,
while holding that there is no need to address the constitutionality of raceconscious admissions in general because the racial diversity achieved
through the Ten Percent Plan means that explicit attention to race in holistic
admissions is not the most narrowly tailored way to address the University's
legitimate diversity interests. His other most plausible option is to reiterate
the conclusion that, to the surprise of many Court watchers, seven Justices
agreed upon in Fisher1;'o namely, to remand the case to the Fifth Circuit
with the possibility of developing a more substantial evidentiary base. This
time, however, Kennedy would almost certainly write so as to mandate a full
district court hearing rather than again leaving the matter to the Fifth
Circuit's discretion. Foes of affirmative action would surely prefer the first
of these outcomes, while those who would like to see the UT Austin's
holistic admissions system upheld would consider a remand for a full hearing
as a victory.
Justice Kennedy's judicial philosophy and past pronouncements tell us
little about the outcome he would prefer. Moreover, it is possible that legal
precedent will have less influence on Justice Kennedy's decision than
attitudes and considerations that have little formal legal relevance. Thus, in
the series of gay rights that concluded with the extension of the Fourteenth
Amendment's protections against discrimination to same sex couples seeking
to marry, Justice Kennedy, always the swing vote, seemed moved not so
much by legal logic as by an abiding conviction that to deny gay couples the
right to marry was an affront to human dignity."i Considerations and values
that are similar in that they are more or less extralegal could also motivate
Kennedy's decision in FisherII.

9. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit held that the
University of Texas's race-conscious admissions system was unconstitutional. Id. at 962. This was
binding on schools in Texas until the Supreme Court decided differently in Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
10. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422.
11. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015).
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A Slap in the Face

I see four factors of little legal relevance that might nonetheless affect
Justice Kennedy's decision. First is anger at the Fifth Circuit's handling of
the Fisher I remand. Reading Fisher , it appears that Justice Kennedy
expected the circuit court to act in one of two ways. It might have found that
using the more stringent reading of "strict scrutiny" that Kennedy enunciated
in FisherI, UT Austin's use of race-conscious holistic admissions did not
pass the Fourteenth Amendment's narrow tailoring requirement.
Alternatively Justice Kennedy might have been satisfied had the circuit court
remanded FisherI to the district court for a fact-finding trial, much like the
trial that created the record in Grutter.
The Fifth Circuit did neither. Rather it looked again at the record on
which it had previously decided and reaffirmed its prior decision. It is hard
to see this disposition as anything other than a slap in the face to the Supreme
Court. The Fifth Circuit is in effect saying that the record presented to the
Supreme Court in Fisher I was not only sufficient to decide Fisher's
challenge, but could admit of only one outcome. If the Fifth Circuit was
astute enough to see this, why wasn't the Supreme Court?
No one would have felt this slap harder than Kennedy, who wrote for the
Court in Fisher1 12 Moreover, he dropped substantial hints that UT Austin's
policies could not pass constitutional muster. In his FisherI opinion, Justice
Kennedy cut back significantly on the leeway that Grutter appeared to give
universities to design affirmative action programs-leeway the Fifth Circuit
accorded UT Austin when it originally heard the case.' 3 Grutter seemed to
say that not only was it for universities to decide whether racial diversity
served a valuable educational function, but also that if a university so decided
courts should defer to the university's judgment on how best to achieve that
diversity.14 Justice Kennedy endorsed deference on only the first issue. 5 He
effectively reversed part of Grutterby holding that judicial deference on how
best to achieve diversity has no place in equal protection analysis. 16 Strict
scrutiny, even if not fatal in fact, must be as strict as it is for the most
invidious racial classifications: "It must be remembered that 'the mere
recitation of a "benign" or legitimate purpose for a racial classification is
entitled to little or no weight.'. . . The higher education dynamic does not
change the narrow tailoring analysis of strict scrutiny applicable in other

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Fisher1, 133 S. Ct. at 2415.
Id. at 2420.
Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
Fisher1, 133 S.Ct. at 2419.
Id. at 2420.
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contexts."' 7
Kennedy also implied that, as he read the record, it was unlikely that the
UT Austin plan could meet the narrow tailoring requirement:
Narrow tailoring ... requires that the reviewing court verify that it is
"necessary" for a university to use race to achieve the educational
benefits of diversity. This involves a careful judicial inquiry into
whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using
racial classifications. Although "[n]arrow tailoring does not require
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative," strict
scrutiny does require a court to examine with care, and not defer to, a
university's "serious, good faith consideration of workable raceneutral alternatives."...
The reviewing court must ultimately be
satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the
educational benefits of diversity. If "'a nonracial approach ...could
promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable
administrative expense,"' then the university may not consider
race .... [S]trict scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate
burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial classifications, that
available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice.18
Just in case his description of the relevant law provided the circuit court
with insufficient guidance about how he saw things, Kennedy's description
of the facts is a dead giveaway:
The University's revised admissions process, coupled with the
operation of the Top Ten Percent Law, resulted in a more racially
diverse environment at the University.
Before the admissions
program at issue in this case, in the last year under the post-Hopwood
AI/PAI system that did not consider race, the entering class was 4.5%
African-American and 16.9% Hispanic. This is in contrast with the
1996 pre-Hopwood and Top Ten Percent regime, when race was
explicitly considered, and the University's entering freshman class
was 4.1% African-American and 14.5% Hispanic.19
If the Texas Ten Percent Plan yielded even greater racial diversity than
had been achieved using race-conscious admissions, how could a partial
reversion to the prior system, which had achieved less diversity, be
considered narrowly tailored? Although answers can be given, a new trial
would be needed to provide them. Ingredients of an answer require first
recognizing that UT Austin still has never achieved a critical mass of
African-American enrollees, and that apparent progress in enrolling
Hispanics is far from commensurate with the huge increase in the proportion

17. Id. at 2421 (citations omitted).
18. Id. at 2420 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 2416.
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of Hispanics among Texas high school graduates. When it comes to
diversity, the Ten Percent Plan has, at best, allowed Texas to tread water. At
a district court hearing, UT Austin might bolster its diversity-within-diversity
argument with evidence showing that race-conscious holistic admissions
fostered educationally important diversity in ways that went beyond simply
increasing minority numbers. It might also have been able to muster
demographic information suggesting that, looking ahead, the number of
African-American Ten Percent Plan beneficiaries was likely to diminish as
Hispanics attended in larger numbers high schools that are now
predominantly African-American.
It is hard to say what effect such
evidence-based arguments might have had on Justice Kennedy, but without a
judge's concrete evidence-based findings, these kinds of considerations are
likely to have little resonance with him.
I expect Justice Kennedy would have greeted favorably a Fifth Circuit
decision for Abigail Fisher and examined unemotionally a decision
upholding UT Austin's holistic admissions system that was rooted in detailed
trial court findings, but it is hard to believe that he was anything but furious
when he saw how cavalierly the circuit court treated his hints and concerns.
This would not bode well for the University, except UT Austin wanted the
Fifth Circuit to remand for a chance to make a more complete record.
Fisher's attorneys were the ones who opposed remand, a point Justice
Kennedy confirmed in one of the few questions he posed at the oral
argument.20
On matters of race, Justice Kennedy's head and gut-and by gut I mean
to include implicit prowhite biases 2' often seem conflicted. The whitefavoring gut usually wins, while the only inroad the head makes is to add a
caveat that perhaps the next case will be one in which minority-favoring race
consciousness is permissible. The Fifth Circuit's handling of the remand can
only strengthen the influence that Kennedy's gut, and the implicit biases that
I expect drive it, may have on his Fisher II analysis. One can even ask
whether anger at the Fifth Circuit's treatment of his earlier opinion could

20. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Fisher H, No. 14-981 (argued Dec. 9, 2015).

21. Considerable research suggests that most white Americans and some black Americans hold
prowhite (or antiblack) biases, and that these biases can influence decisions people make. For
example, studies indicate that implicit biases are associated with differences in how physicians treat
white and black patients, with the former receiving better treatment and superior pain management.
See, e.g., Janice A. Sabin & Anthony G. Greenwald, The Influence of Implicit Bias on Treatment
Recommendations for 4 Common Pediatric Conditions: Pain, Urinary Tract Infection, Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and Asthma, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 988, 989 (2012); David
R. Williams & Ronald Wyatt, Racial Bias in Health Care and Health: Challenges and
Opportunities, 314 JAMA 555, 555 (2015). To be clear, I mean neitherto say nor imply that Justice
Kennedy is a racist, but am rather suggesting that he almost certainly holds biases that he himself
might not recognize, but which are more likely than not to characterize men of his generation and
which may influence his discretionary judgments.
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lead Kennedy to decide against UT Austin not just on narrow tailoring
grounds, but with a determination to resolve the conflict between gut and
head by deciding, once and for all, that race-conscious university admissions
is necessarily unconstitutional. Alternatively, remand may become the more
attractive option, for Justice Kennedy may see in Fisher's Fifth Circuit
argument against remanding a fear that the University could provide
evidence sufficient to justify the attention given race in holistic admissions.
III. Black Lives Matter
Also irrelevant but also possibly affecting Justice Kennedy's views is the
way the country was roiled by the police shooting of an unarmed black man
in Ferguson, Missouri, and by similar shootings in other parts of the
country.22 Although these events receive less news coverage now that the
races for the presidential nominations have heated up, they dominated the
news when FisherII was argued and the vote following oral argument taken.
By themselves these shootings might have moved Justice Kennedy to look
with greater sympathy on efforts to boost the life chances of black people by
placing a small thumb on the scale of college admissions, for if the gay rights
cases tell us anything, it is that Kennedy values human dignity and can
empathize with those whose social identities lead to the denial of rights and
an inability to reach their full potential. It is hard to imagine a greater affront
to full personhood than to have a heightened risk of being killed by a police
officer because of the color of one's skin.
But the police shootings weren't the only racially charged issues in the
news about the time FisherII was argued. There was the rise of the Black
Lives Matter (BLM) movement and widespread protests, some of which
turned riotous. 23 Perhaps most tellingly, if we are speculating about potential

influences on Justice Kennedy, there was a widely reported incident in which
a student photographer asserting a First Amendment right to report was first
deflected from entering a public space occupied by BLM protesters and later
threatened with physical removal from the area.24 Whatever gut-level
sympathies for African Americans the police killings of unarmed blacks may
have engendered in Kennedy, they could have been more than neutralized by
videos of rioters engaged in property destruction and by what the media
22. Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/1 3/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-afterpolice-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/ZP3V-N6YD].
23. See, e.g., Christina Capecchi, 'Black Lives AMfatter' Protesters Gather; Aall Is Shut in
Response, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/24/us/black-lives-matterprotesters-gather-mall-of-america-is-shut.html [https://penna.cc/Y S3B-5WVZ].
24. Austin Huguelet & Daniel Victor, I Need Some Muscle': Afissouri Activists Block
Journalists, N.Y TIES (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com!2015/11/10/us/universitymissouri-protesters-block-journalists-press-freedom.htm [https://penna.cc/9FBQ-EASM].
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portrayed as the First Amendment threatening actions of BLM student
protesters, some of whom were perhaps beneficiaries of affirmative action.
(Never mind that it was a white professor who caught the most flack by
calling for "muscle" when she could not persuade the photographer to respect
the protesters' enclave. 25 ) If the protests persuade Justice Kennedy that
minority college students are prone to suppressing speech, he is likely to
think less kindly about programs that bring minority students to campuses.
IV. Mismatch
Kennedy's decision could also be influenced by legally irrelevant claims
that affirmative action harms minorities through "academic mismatch" or
science mismatch." These arguments were presented to the Court in briefs
offered by Richard Sander26 and by Gail Heriot and Peter Kirsanow,27 and
they were referenced by Justice Scalia in oral argument.28 Mismatch theory
suggests that affirmative action places beneficiaries of affirmative action in
classrooms where instruction is pitched to a level that they have trouble
following, meaning that these students learn less than they would have
learned at less selective institutions and do worse on the job market after
graduation.29 So-called science mismatch, which has become a fallback
position for affirmative action's critics since general mismatch claims have
been thoroughly debunked, posits that the more a science-interested minority
student has benefitted from affirmative action the less likely that student is to
graduate with a degree in a science. 0 Neither kind of mismatch, if it exists,
has obvious constitutional significance, but if Justice Kennedy thinks
affirmative action is likely to hurt its intended beneficiaries it could affect his
vote. It would allow him to see a decision invalidating affirmative action as
one that bravely advances the interests of minority students rather than
retards them. Most likely he would miss the resonance that "whites know
best" arguments like this have with some of the paternalistic justifications for
slavery and the racial segregation that followed.
If Justice Kennedy's decision were influenced by a belief that minorities
suffered due to academic mismatch, it would reflect inexcusable ignorance or

25. Id.
26. Brief Amicus Curiae for Richard Sander in Support of Neither Party, FisherII, No. 14-981
(argued Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Sander-brief-forFisher-v-Univesrity-of-Texas-corrected.pdf [https://penna.cc/6B2P-93DU].
27. Brief Amicus Curiae of Gail Heriot and Peter N. Kirsanow, Members of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights in Support of Petitioner, Fisher II, No. 14-981 (argued Dec. 9, 2015)
[hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae of Heriot & Kirsanow], http://www.scotusblog.comlwpcontent/uploads/2015/09/14-981-tsac-Gail-Heriot-et-al.pdf [https://penna.cc/L648-DC2P].
28. Transcript of Oral Argument, Fisher II, supra note 20, at 67 68.
29. Brief Amicus Curiae of Heriot & Kirsanow, supra note 27, at 22 25.
30. Id. at 25.
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an inability to understand relevant social science.
I say inexcusable
ignorance because the Court had before it amicus briefs that review the social
science evidence and show that the empirical research relied on to support
mismatch claims is fundamentally flawed. The briefs reveal that the
overwhelming number of studies either find no evidence of mismatch or find
that affirmative action students do better in graduation rates and later in life
than they would have done had they attended less selective schools (reverse
mismatch effects). 3' The analytic weaknesses of key studies that purport to
find evidence consistent with mismatch theory are documented in a brief
submitted by eleven leading empirical scientists. They advise the Court that
these studies are so methodologically deficient that their results should be
dismissed out of hand.3 2 The critique is more than credible. Few of the
brief's signers were previously involved in empirical or legal debates
regarding affirmative action, and two signers are members of the National
Academy of Sciences.33 These latter two, along with several others, are
3 4
widely recognized as among the nation's top social science methodologists.
Other briefs review the literature that compares minorities who benefited
from affirmative action with similarly skilled minorities who attended less
selective schools. These studies, most of which focus on undergraduates,
find little evidence that minorities are harmed by affirmative action, and
some evidence that they benefit significantly from the competitive
environments that affirmative action opened up for them.
The most
extensive review offered the Court is in an amicus brief I wrote.35
The science mismatch claim has, as an empirical matter, a bit more
going for it than the academic mismatch claim, but not much. Moreover, the
paternalism of arguments built on science mismatch means they have little
role to play in affirmative action debates. There are a handful of studies
looking at the degrees received by minorities who in their college

31. For a general review, see SIGAL ALON, RACE, CLASS, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 222
fig.10.3 (2015). An example of the kinds of results commonly encountered is Alon's finding that
the beneficiaries of race-conscious admissions at elite universities had higher graduation rates
compared to the simulated "matched" SES-disadvantaged students who had similar credentials but
enrolled at somewhat less selective institutions. The gap favoring underrepresented minorities was
eight points (73% versus 65% graduation rates) at the school where they first enrolled, and five
points (77% versus 72%) in terms of graduating anywhere with a degree.
32. Brief of Empirical Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12 16, Fisher II,
No.
14-981
(argued Dec. 9,
2015) [hereinafter Brief of Empirical
Scholars],
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/LCCR-and-Mintz-Fisher-AmicusEmpirical-Scholars.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4Q9-FEFD].
33. Id. at 1 7.
34. Id. at2 3.
35. Brief Amicus Curiae for Richard Lempert in Support of Respondents, Fisher H, No. 14-981
(argued Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Lempert-Amicusin-Fisher-v.-U.-Texas-No.-14-981-Filed-Copy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QYM-JXXN].
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36
applications or upon entering college express an interest in a science major.
The studies suggest that these students are less likely to persist to a science
degree than they would have been had they attended less competitive
institutions.37 Moreover, there is a plausible mechanism that can explain
these results. Many students, and in some schools the majority of students,
who enter college intending to major in a so-called hard science or
engineering end up majoring in the humanities, professional programs, or a
social science.38 It appears that one reason why students switch to
nonscience majors is because their science course grades are low, either
absolutely or relative to what they earn in other courses. 39 Beneficiaries of
affirmative action have, by definition, academic credentials which predict
they will do worse gradewise, at least in their freshman year, than students
who receive no affirmative action boost. Admissions credentials are far from
perfect predictors, but they do explain some grade variance. Hence students
admitted to selective schools with a boost from affirmative action are likely
to have lower grades in basic science courses than they would have had if
they had attended less selective institutions. To the extent that low science
grades motivate switches from science to other majors, students who might
have completed science majors at less selective schools may earn degrees in
other majors at more competitive institutions.
This argument and its empirical support is, however, not nearly as
powerful as its proponents claim. Bowen and Bok, who looked at twentyeight selective schools, found that affirmative action minorities were about as
likely to end up majoring in a science as their white peers.40 Differences
emerge only when one looks at desistence differences, a statistic that reflects
not just science degree completion but also the greater tendency of
41
minorities, relative to whites, to express an initial interest in science.
Desistance rate differences may in large measure reflect not academic
difficulties, but greater initial ignorance about what science majors entail.
Moreover, not only do about half of all students, including whites, who begin
college expecting to major in a science end up majoring in another subject,
but women are more likely to abandon intended science majors than men.42
Indeed, male-female desistance differences are in some data sets almost as

36. See, e.g., Frederick L. Smyth & John J. McArdle, Ethnic and Gender Differences in Science
Graduation at Selective Colleges with Implicationsfor Admission Policy and College Choice, 45
RES. HIGHEREDUC. 353, 353 54 (2004).

37. Id. at 373.
38. Id. at 373 76.
39. Brief of Empirical Scholars, supra note 32, at 11.
40. WILLIAM

G.

BOWEN & DEREK CURTIS BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM

CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS

41. See Smyth & McArdle, supra note 36, at 376.
42. Id. at 354.

382 (1998).
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large as differences between affirmative action minorities and white
students. 43 Affirmative action cannot explain the gender differences, and few
would insist that women who want to major in science should attend less
selective schools than the most selective schools that will admit them or that
they will be better off if they do so.
This latter point is crucial. Affirmative action minorities who abandon
intended science majors still graduate with degrees from selective
institutions. The science mismatch argument against affirmative action is
thus paternalistic in the extreme. It suggests that it is the law's business to
ensure that students who could have graduated from elite schools, like U.C.
Berkeley, with degrees in English or psychology instead graduate from
barely selective schools, like U.C. Riverside, with degrees in biology or
mathematics. In short, if Justice Kennedy is influenced by oft-debunked
mismatch theory or by the limited and often ambiguous evidence supporting
science mismatch, it will most likely be because he is unacquainted with the
critical literature and too readily accepts claims made mainly by people who
have the not-so-secret agenda of limiting or invalidating race-conscious
admissions. His vote, however, will still be dispositive regardless of whether
mistaken views about mismatch theory motivate it.
V.

Scalia's Death

The final irrelevancy that may influence Justice Kennedy is the death of
Justice Scalia. How this will cut is difficult to say. Perhaps Justice Kennedy
will think it unwise to address the constitutionality of the Texas holistic
admissions system, much less the constitutionality of affirmative action, in
an opinion unlikely to secure more than four votes. If so, one possibility is to
again remand the case to the Fifth Circuit, instructing it that a trial is needed
to develop an adequate record. Or the issue could be avoided entirely.
Abigail Fisher's standing to bring suit has always been tenuous, since it
appears that she would not have been admitted to UT Austin even if no
minority applicants had enjoyed preferences.
The Court has never
thoroughly addressed the standing issue, and if he wished, Justice Kennedy
could decide that the Court should rethink its determination of standing and,
no doubt, find three other Justices who would agree to dismiss for want of
standing. Taking this path would, however, indicate that he erred in his
FisherI opinion by not disposing of the case then for want of standing.
Alternatively, Justice Kennedy might realize that once a successor to
Scalia is appointed, he may no longer be the swing vote on affirmative
action, and he may want to leave his imprimatur on affirmative action while
he controls the language in the opinion. This could make a decision
43. Id. at 357.
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invalidating affirmative action more likely, but it could also lead to an
opinion more specifically defining strict scrutiny in the context of college
admisions and clarifying situations in which race-conscious government
decisions can pass constitutional muster and when they can't.
VI. Mea Culpa and a Few Words from the Justice
If the reader by this point sees my discussion as highly speculative, the
reader is right. I offer it only as speculation, as possibilities to be pondered
rather than tight analysis. My intent has been to explore legally extraneous
and largely irrelevant considerations that could affect how Justice Kennedy
decides in Fisher II. I have my own ideas of what might motivate Justice
Kennedy, but my ideas may tell the reader more about me than about the
Justice. So let me close with Justice Kennedy speaking for himself and four
other Justices just last term in a case holding that the federal Fair Housing
Act allowed disparate impact liability:
While the automatic or pervasive injection of race into public and
private transactions covered by the FHA has special dangers, it is also
true that race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a
proper fashion. ... [This court] does not impugn housing authorities'
race-neutral efforts to encourage revitalization of communities that
have long suffered the harsh consequences of segregated housing
patterns. When setting their larger goals, local housing authorities
may choose to foster diversity and combat racial isolation with raceneutral tools, and mere awareness of race in attempting to solve the
problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor at the outset.
... In striving to achieve our "historic commitment to creating an
integrated society," we must remain wary of policies that reduce
homeowners to nothing more than their race. But since the passage of
the Fair Housing Act in 1968 and against the backdrop of disparateimpact liability in nearly every jurisdiction, many cities have become
more diverse. The FHA must play an important part in avoiding the
Kerner Commission's grim prophecy that "[o]ur Nation is moving
toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal."
The Court acknowledges the Fair Housing Act's continuing
role in
44
moving the Nation toward a more integrated society.
This language suggests that Justice Kennedy may need no irrelevant
incentives to invalidate race-conscious admissions.Although allowing
Housing Authorities to use race-conscious procedures to combat housing

44. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2525 26 (2015) (citations omitted).
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segregation, he only approves of plans that do not single out race as the
reason for different treatment. In the context of Fisher II, his language
suggests that he would find the Texas Ten Percent Plan constitutional
because no matter how clear the race consciousness that led to its enactment,
it is on its face race neutral. However, the same language suggests he would
find UT Austin's holistic admissions system unconstitutional because it is
not race neutral.
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Texas
Department of Housing45 can be read as implying that no system that
explicitly advantages an applicant because of race can be sufficiently
narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster, even though a variety of
approaches that use proxies for race, however obvious their race-privileging
motivation, can pass constitutional muster.
Will Justice Kennedy go this far in a FisherII opinion that, as the swing
vote, he is likely to write? This is unclear. Fisher II differs from Texas
Department ofHousing in that there is clear precedent by two well-regarded
Justices, Powell and O'Connor, that allow race-conscious admissions to
promote educational diversity. Still, even if all affirmative action is not
invalidated, no one should be surprised by a Kennedy opinion holding that
the racial diversity achieved by the Texas Ten Percent Plan renders any
admissions protocol that specifically references race too broadly tailored to
be constitutional. Or Justice Kennedy could hold that while race-conscious
admissions are not necessarily ruled out, UT Austin must first attempt means
of adding to its minority student population that do not explicitly consider a
student's race. Unless the case is remanded for a hearing, this is perhaps the
best that supporters of affirmative action can expect from a Kennedy opinion.
UT Austin claims, however, that it has tried every promising race-neutral
measure to increase the number of minority students on campus while
strengthening their average qualifications. Perhaps if the Fifth Circuit judges
who found twice for the University had remanded the case for a district court
hearing, the district court judge would have found facts sufficient to convince
even Justice Kennedy that only by explicit attention to race could UT Austin
attain its constitutionally compelling diversity interests. Of course, we know
now that if the Fifth Circuit had remanded the case, its return to the Supreme
Court would have been delayed, and when and if it next reached the Court,
the Supreme Court's bench would most likely have been either a decidedly
more sympathetic Court or one bent on eradicating affirmative action. No
matter how Fisher II is decided, we can expect that a Court more like the
first, or one more like the second, will before long resolve the issue.

45. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507
(2015).

